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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY RODGERS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
ANNIE N. HANSEN and 
ALBERT J. HANSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 15334 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to quiet title to the 
subject property in herself. Defendants counterclaimed seeking 
to quiet title to a two-thirds interest in the subject property 
in themselves and a one-third interest in plaintiff as trustee 
for the heirs of Myrtle Neil (among whom are numbered plaintiff 
and the defendant, Annie N. Hansen). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
District Judge, sitting without jury on September 23, 1976. 
Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on March 25, 1977. 
(R.123-124.) The judgment dismissed plaintiff's complaint 
.:ith prejudice and granted judgment in favor of defendants on 
'' ~ 1' Coun tcrclaim. (Id.) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment with regard 
to the dismissal of her Complaint and with regard to the 
granting of defendant's Counterclaim insofar as it relates to 
their two-thirds interest in the subject property. Plaintiff 
does not seek reversal of the court's determination that she 
was holding the interest which she received from Myrtle C. 
Neil in trust for Mrs. Neil's heirs. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
By a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated April 25, 1942, 
William and Vivian Newsome agreed to sell the subject property 
to Harold and Myrtle Neil. (Ex. 1-P.) The purchase price 
under the contract was $3,250.00. (Id.) Because the Neils 
were experiencing financial difficulties, their daughter and 
son-in-law, defendants here, assisted them in making the down-
payment and in paying a number of the monthly installments 
due under the contract. (Tr. 68-72.) In all, defendants paid 
$725.00 prior to the final balloon payment of $2,389.00. (Id.,I 
During the time that the defendants were aiding the Neils to 
meet their obligations under the contract, Mr. Neil died. 
(R. 19-20.) Thereafter, defendants sold an unrelated piece of 
real estate and used the proceeds f rora the sale thereof to 
pay the balance due under the contract, $2,389.00. (R.96, 
paragraph 2; Tr. 72.) On July 7, 1944, the Newsomes executed 
a warranty deed conveying the subject property to "Myrtle C. 
Neil and Annie N. Hansen and Albert J. Hansen, her husband 
-2-
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as joint tenants and not as tenants in common". (Ex. 2-P.) 
After execution of the warranty deed, defendants 
allowed Mrs. Neil to remain in possession of the subject 
property and to retain rents paid by boarders. (Tr. 73-75.) 
Although there appears to have been no specific agreement in 
this regard, there was apparently an understanding between the 
parties that Mrs. Neil would pay the taxes and maintain the 
property. Defendants offered occasional financial assistance 
in paying the taxes and assisted Mrs. Neil in providing main-
tenance and repairs. (Id.) 
Beginning with a receipt dated October 20, 1944, 
Annie Hansen executed a series of 43 receipts purporting to 
show receipt of a total of $1, 334. 00 from Mrs. Neil. (Ex. 6-P.) 
The first of these receipts shows a "previous balance" of 
$2,389.00, and payment of $25.00 for "payment on house 
412 North 2nd West". The last such receipt, dated August 5, 
1949, shows a balance due of $1,055.00. Although this parti-
cular receipt does not show the purpose for which the payment 
was made, the receipts typically state that the payment 
(usually $25.00) was for "payment on house" or "payment on 
home". 
When asked about the purpose of these receipts at 
trial, defendants responded that the receipts were given to 
Mrs. Neil to aid her in obtaining additional welfare benefits. 
Defendants acknowledged, however, receipt of money from Hrs. Neil 
'''l ,, sporadic basis. (Tr. 78-79, 85-86.) In most cases 
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Mrs. Neil did not specify the purpose for which the money was 
given (Tr. 87); however, some payments were given to the Hansen, 
to be delivered to a creditor. (Tr. 84-85.) 
In 1958, apparently upset by a proposed sale of the 
property by the Hansens, Mrs. Neil contacted an attorney, 
Emmett L. Brown, who, by a letter dated September 29, 1958, 
wrote to the Hansens. In his letter Mr. Brown objected to 
the proposal that the Hansen's take two-thirds of the appreci-
ated value of the property. He also explained Mrs. Neil's 
concern that because of the joint tenancy she would not be 
able to leave her interest to all of her heirs. He acknow-
ledged that Mrs. Neil was aware that the Hansens claimed the 
property as joint tenants. (Id.) Mrs. Hansen responded by 
a letter dated September 30, 1958, in which she reaffirmed 
the right of her and her husband to two-thirds of the proceeds 
of the sale of the house. (Ex. 14-P.) 
On February 12, 1964, in an effort to sever the joint 
tenancy between herself and defendants, Mrs. Neil conveyed 
her interest in the property by quit claim deed to the plain-
tiff. On the same date, plaintiff reconveyed the property 
to Mrs. Neil, thus destroying the joint tenancy as between 
Mrs. Neil and the defendants. (Ex. 3-P, Ex. 4-P.) At trial 
plaintiff admitted that at the time of the above transactions 
Mrs. Neil was aware that defendants asserted a two-thirds fee 
interest in the subject property. (Tr. 39.) 
-4-
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In the summer of 1968, several members of the family, 
including Mrs. Neil, defendants, and plaintiff met at de-
fendant's home in Ogden, Utah, at plaintiff's request to dis-
cuss Mrs. Neil's will. (Tr. 76, 88.) During the conversation 
plaintiff took the lead in stating that the Hansens had loaned 
money to Mrs. Neil and that she had repaid all but $250.00 
of the debt. (Tr. 32-33.) Although the evidence is dis-
puted, Mrs. Neil apparently said nothing during the conversa-
tion. (Tr. 77, 89, 102.) In the course of the meeting, 
defendants reaffirmed their belief that they were owners of 
a share of the subject property (Tr. 37,101-102), at the same 
time denying existence of a loan. (Tr. 76, 100-101.) 
Mrs. Neil died on August 24, 1975, without ever having 
attempted to seek a legal determination of her rights in the 
property. Shortly before her death, Mrs. Neil executed a 
second quit claim deed in favor of plaintiff. (Ex. 5-P.) 
Prior to her death she executed a will which directed her 
executrix, Mrs. Rogers, to distribute her estate equally 
among her six children. (Ex. 8-D.) 
Plaintiff commenced the present action on September 
12, 1975. In her Complaint, plaintiff alleged that the parties 
to the 1944 Deed intended that Mrs. Neil would receive fee 
title to the subject property subject only to a mortgage inter-
est in favor of defendants. (Record p. 2-4.) 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT DEFENDAl'JTS OIVN A FEE INTEREST 
RATHER THAN A MORTGAGE IN THE PROPER'I'Y. 
Plaintiff claims that the 1944 Warranty Deed which oni 
face purports to convey the subject property to Mrs. Neil and to 
defendants was in fact intended to create the relationship of 
mortgagor/mortgagee between Mrs. Neil and the defendants. Thus, 
the critical question of fact which the court below was called m 
to determine was what the intent of the parties to the deed was. 
Contrary to plaintiff's allegations, the trial court 
found that the parties intended that the 1944 Deed conveyed the 
subject property to Mrs. Neil and the defendants as joint tenant 
and that no mortgage was intended. The relevant findings of fac'. 
by the trial court state: 
6. Prior to the time of execution of the Warranty 
Deed, Mrs. Neil agreed that defendants would 
be named as joint tenants thereon. Upon its 
execution, she received a copy of the deed 
which she took to the county recorder's office 
for recordation. 
7. The granters under the Warranty Deed intended 
to convey the property in joint tenancy to 
defendants and Mrs. Neil. Mrs. Neil never 
asked the granters to change the deed nor did 
she ever express dissatisfaction as to its 
provisions. 
8. Defendants neither agreed with Mrs. Neil that 
they would sell their interest in the subject 
property to her nor that they would treat the 
Warranty Deed as conveying the property to 
Mrs. Neil only, while creating a mortgage 
interest in themselves. (R. 111.) 
This court has long adopted the view that the evide~r 
-6-
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should be reviewed in the light most favorable to sustain the 
findings of the tryer of fact. Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 
(Utah 1975). 
Even in equity actions where this court has the preroga-
tive of reviewing the evidence, the presumption has been adopted 
that the tryer of fact is better able to weigh the evidence and 
veracity of testimony than an appeals court, and therefore that the 
evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to sustain the 
trial court's findings. As to the review of the findings of the 
court in an equity of action, this court has stated: 
Notwithstanding the fact that in an equity case 
such as this it is our prerogative to review the 
evidence, we ordinarily re~os~ sorne confidence in 
the verity of the actions of the trial court; and 
assume that he believed those aspects of the evi-
dence which are in accord with his findings and 
judgment. Foster v. Blake Heights Corporation, 
530 P.2d 815, 816 (Utah 1974). 
Thus, in Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 34, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972), 
this court was called upon to determine whether the trial court was 
correct in finding that certain payments had been made against one 
of two loans. The court refused to overturn the trial court's 
findings saying: 
[T)he trial court did not adopt defendant's inter-
pretation of the transaction; this was a factual 
determination which cannot be disturbed on appeal. 
Id., at 1346 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975), 
the appellant alleged that the findings of an advisory jury in an 
equity action and the findings and decision of the court were not 
supported by the evidence. In affirming the trial court's decision 
Hns court stated: 
-7-
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It seems necessary and appropriate to reiterate 
the oft stated rule of review: that we are 
obliged to survey the record, not as the defendant 
views the facts from his defensive position, but 
in the light favorable to the findings made by 
the advisory jury and to the findings and decision 
made thereon by the trial court. Id., at 356. 
The trial transcript and the documentary evidence int 
instant case indicate that there was ample support for the court 
findings that the parties to the 1944 Deed did not intend that~ 
Neil would receive the entire fee estate. That evidence include 
the following: 
(a) Albert Hansen, one of the parties to the 1944 Dee. 
gave the following testimony: 
Q. 
that you 
deed? 
A. 
Q. 
Did you discuss the fact with Mrs. Hansen 
planned on having three of the names on the 
Yes. 
Do you know who it was who suggested to Mr. 
that three names be placed on the deed? 
I suggested it. 
Newsome 
A. 
Q. 
did it? 
Did you discuss that with Mrs. Neil before yo 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Did she ever raise any objection to that 
procedure? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you enter into any sort of agreement witf: 
Mrs. Neil concerning income from the property if any 
was generated? 
A. No. 
Q. What about the payment of taxes? 
A. Well, we--she and I figured that if she paid 
the taxes that would be fair enough as long as she w~ 
living in the place. 
Q. Then did you agree that she would remain in 
possession of the house? 
A. Yes, as long as she lived. 
Q. And upon her death? 
A. Well, at that time we just figured that if 
it was either any of us it would go to the other two. 
Q. Did you ever agree with Mrs. Neil that you 
would convey your interest in the property to her? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there ever any agreement that the deed 
from Mr. Newsome would convey only a mortgage interes 
to you? 
-8-
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A. No. 
Q. Did you ever agree that Mrs. Neil would 
pay you back for the moneys you spent on the house? 
A. No, she never had any obligations. 
(Tr. 72 (lines 29-30), 73 (all), 74 (lines 1-3).) 
~1r. Hansen's uncontradicted testimony clearly supports 
the court's finding that the 1944 Deed was intended to create the 
very type of relationship between the grantees described thereon, 
namely, that of joint tenants--not that of mortgagor and mortgagees. 
(b) Similarly, in her testimony at trial and in her 
deposition, I1rs. Hansen, another party to the 1944 Deed, described 
the relationship between the grantees as that which is recognized 
at law as a joint tenancy: 
Q. Now, was there any kind of an understanding, 
or an agreement, that you had with your mother between 
1942 and 1944 when you were making these payments? 
A. She said, when we went to pay off the big 
payment, that if we would pay it off, why, then and 
put her name on the deed, why then it would be all 
equal, and when she was through with it, why then the 
property would belong to us, vice versa, with us. 
We figured that if we died before she did, why 
then, it would be the other two. (Deposition of 
Annie Hansen P. 9, lines 9-lB) 
Concerning the existence of the alleged loan and mortgage, 
Hrs. Hansen gave the following testir:iony: 
Q. !1rs. Hansen, it has been alleged that there 
is an agreement between your mother and you and your 
husband that you would - that you would loan her the 
money. Was there ever such a loan? 
A. There was never a loan. We paid off the 
house. She had a name on the deeds. She was living 
in the house, so why would we need a loan? 
Q. Did you ever agree to convey your interest 
in the property to her? 
A. Never did. 
(Tr. B7 (lines 29-30), BB (lines 1-3) (emphasis added).) 
(c) Gayla Hansen, daughter of the defendants, and grand-
liter of Mrs. Neil testified that in a conversation she had with 
-9-
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Mrs. Neil in 1968, her grandmother spoke of her one-third inter, 
in the subject property: 
Q. . .. What did she say? 
A. She said, "\,Jell, I just -" toward the 
end of the whole discussion she just said to me 
tl1at, well, she thought she could do with her third 
what she wanted to. 
Q. Did she use the word "one-third"? 
A. Yes sir. 
(Tr. 101 (lines 21-26).) 
It is perhaps stating the obvious to remark that Hrs. 
Neil's acknowledgment that she considered herself to be a one-tr. 
interest holder in the subject property is inconsistent with the 
plaintiff's theory that Mrs. Neil owned the entire fee estate 
subject only to a mortgage in favor of defendants. 
{d) As early as 1958, Mrs. Hansen in response to a 
letter, had written to her mother's attorney that she and her 
husband claimed a two-thirds interest in the property and thatt 
money which they paid for the house was not intended as a loan. 
Mrs. Hansen wrote: 
We have no intentions of selling the house she [i.e., 
Mrs. Neil] is living in now or ever. We bought the 
house for her to live in, enjoy [sic] do what she 
wants to in so she would always have a roof over her 
head. We have never asked her for one penney of 
anything • . . So we offered her our little new 
rambler to live in and sell her house and finish 
the one we have started for ourselves and give her 
1/3 of the money we got from the house to live on 
or whatever she wanted to do. We asked nothing 
except 2/3rds. . . . (Letter to Emmett L. Brown 
dated September 30, 1958, Exhibit 14P) 
The above passages clearly express the belief of the 
defendants that Mrs. Neil was not obligated to repay them fort 
having purchased the property. The letter also shows that it t 
the view of the Hansens that if the property were sold, they~ 
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t 
be entitled to two-thirds 0£ the proceeds of the sale. such a 
belief is consistent with the Hansen's contention that the deed 
was intended to convey a two-thirds interest as joint tenants to 
them, but inconsistent with the allegation that they intended to 
take only a mortgage in the subject property. 
(e) The 1944 Warranty Deed states unequivocally that 
Myrtle C. Neil, Annie Hansen and Albert Hansen were to receive the 
property as joint tenants. (Exhibit 2P.) Mrs. Neil obviously knew 
of the Deed's provisions, since she was the person who recorded it. 
The foregoing evidence presented at trial at the very 
least demonstrates that the trial judge was on firm evidenciary 
ground when he found that the parties to the 1944 Warranty Deed 
intended that the grantees would receive the property as joint 
tenants and not as mortgagor (Mrs. Neil) and mortgagees (Defend-
ants). 
Plaintiff attempts to avoid the fatal effect of the 
trial court's findings on her appeal by directing this court's 
attention to certain receipts bearing Mrs. Hansen's signature and 
by citing the rule that this court is not bound by the interpreta-
tion of documents applied by the trial court. See Lake v. Hermes 
Associates, 552 P.2d 126, 123 (Utah 1976). The weakness of this 
argument is that as shown by the discussion above, there was ample 
evidence to support the court's findings without resort to an 
interpretation of the receipts. Indeed, the court's finding con-
""rning the receipts does not appear to indicate that the court 
·':!.wheel any special significance to them. The relevant Finding 
:. La tes: 
-11-
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9. Beginning on October 20, 1944, and extending 
up until August 5, 1949, defendant, Annie Hansen 
executed a series of 43 receipts purporting to 
show payments by Mrs. Neil to Mrs. Hansen in the 
total sum of $1,159.00. These receipts stated 
that the payments evidence thereby were "for 
payment on house" or "for payment on home". 
The last receipt dated August 5, 1949 indicated 
there was a balance due of $1,055.00. Mrs. Neil 
made no payments to defendants after that date. 
(Tr. 111-112) 
Similarly, the court's Conclusions of Law based upon: 
above Finding contain no indication that it relied on the receir 
indetermining the intention of the parties. The only reference 
to the receipts is found in Conclusion 8 which states: 
The receipts executed by Mrs. Hansen were in-
sufficient to take the alleged agreement out 
of the Statute of Frauds under the Doctrine of 
Part Performance or Written Memorandum. 
(Tr. 114) 
Since the Findings and Conclusions show that the tria: 
court did not rely upon any particular interpretation of the re· 
ceipts, and since there was ample other evidence of a nondocurne: 
character to support its findings, the rule in Lake v. Hermes 
Association, supra, has no relevance. 
A more serious flaw in appellant's argument is thats 
has f~iled to meet her burden of proof in overcoming the clear 
langugage of the 1944 Deed. 
It is a well-accepted rul2 in this jurisdiction that 
presumption of truthfulness and accuracy accorded written instr 
can only be overcome "by clear and convincing evidence." ~ 
Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975). This rule has been appl 
cases where the court has been asked to declare a deed absolu~ 
be in fact a mortgage. In He~s v._.?:nger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P. 
(1919), which involved the issue of equitable mortgage, the co' 
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s: 
s ta tccl: 
We are not unmindful that in this class of cases 
the oral testimony of witnesses should be 
scrutinized by the court with great care and 
that the proof should be olain and convincing 
before the court is authorized to declare upon 
the intention of the parties. Id., at 234 
(emphasis added). ~ 
Similarly, in Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey, 
105 Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943), the court refused to reverse the 
lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action to have a quit 
claim deed declared a mortgage on the grounds, inter alia, that the 
proferred evidence was not such "clear, definite, unequivocal, and 
conclusive evidence as is required to declare a deed a mortgage • • 
Id., at 287. 
Thus, a successful attack on a deed absolute must be 
based upon more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. An 
examination of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff at the trial 
demonstrates that the trial court was correct in ruling that the 
plaintiff had not met her burden of proof. 
Plaintiff's evidence consisted primarily of plaintiff's 
own testimony and of the receipts referred to above. Mrs. Rogers 
was not a party to the transactions and to conversations leading up 
to the execution of the 1944 Deed. However, she attempted to show 
that her mother understood that the deed actually created a mortgage 
by relating conversations she had had with her mother. The first 
of these conversations took place in 1964 in the office of her 
fllother's attorney. Concerning this conversation Mrs. Rogers' 
trstimony is as follows: 
Q. Tell us uhat your mother told Mr. King 
rt'lative to iler understanding as to the ownership 
of this home. 
-13-
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A. Well, she felt like the home was hers and 
that the deed was - very misleading about the nd0cs 
on it. And she felt like - well she told him that 
she had paid the house, the money back for the llan.o~r:: 
and she had paid all the taxes and all of the upkeep. 
And the house was hers as far ilS she was concerne.J, 
as she wanted that severed. And the only way to do 
it, he said, was - without them doing something wi~ 
her - would be to do the quit claim deed. 
(Tr. 30 (lines 10-20) .) 
The second conversation testified to by Mrs. Rogers tc 
place in 1968 in the defendant's home. According to Mrs. Roger: 
in the course of that conversation, which involved several membc 
of the family, Mrs. Neil stated that she thought she still owed 
Hansens about $250.00 and that the Hansens had agreed to charge 
no interest. (Tr. 33 (lines 21-24), 34 (lines 7-8).) 
Concerning these alleged conversations the following 
observations are relevant. First, the conversations took place 
18 years and 8 years,respectively,prior to the time of trial. 
The trial court in weighing the credibility of the evidence ~~ 
reasonably have concluded that Mrs. Rogers' testimony was so 
clouded by the passage of time as to have lost its probative va: 
Indeed, the remarks which Hrs. Rogers attributed to her mother 
were expressed only once as a direct quote. (Tr. 34 (lines 7-81 
On oti1er occasions Mrs. Rogers' paraphrasing of her mother's co~ 
was prefaced by the words "she felt like. " (Tr. 30 (line 12 
Tr. 33 (line 11) .) 
In addition, Mrs. Rogers' testinony as to the remark: 
made by her mother in the 1968 meeting are directly contradicti 
by the testimony of both defendants and of their daughter (Tr. 
77 (line 11), 89 (line 14), 102 (lines 11-19).) Under the cir· 
curnstances it would not be surprising if the trial judge fell t 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~~s. Rogers' testimony fell short of the standard of "clear, definite, 
unequivocal and conclusive" evidence required by Thornley Land & 
Livestock Co. v. Gailey, and Hess v. Anger, supra. As to the 
testimony concerning the intent of a decedent, this court has 
observed: 
It is generally recognized that testimony concerning 
intent of one who is deceased should be looked upon 
with caution; and this is particulary true when such 
testimony is suffused with self-interest. Pagano v. 
Walker, supra, at 454. 
Second, even if Mrs. Rogers' testimony were accepted as 
being completely accurate, and if the Hansen's testimony were dis-
regarded, it does not follow that evidence of the existence of a 
mortgage was so "clear, definite, unequivocal and conclusive" as 
to lead the court ineluctably to the conclusion that the relation-
ship between Mrs. Neil and the defendants was that of mortgagor/ 
mortgagee. Mrs. Rogers' testimony can be summarized as follows: 
(a) Mrs. Neil believed the house was hers; and (b) Mrs. Neil 
believed that she was indebted to the Hansens and that she had 
repaid most of that debt. Such facts, if true, would be consistent 
with a variety of relationships between Mrs. Neil and the defendants. 
It is reasonable to assume, for example, that Mrs. Neil believed 
the house was hers because she was a joint tenant and that she 
had a moral obligation to repay the Hansens for their largess in 
buying the house and placing her name on the deed as a joint tenant. 
In the alternative, Mrs. Neil may have believed that she was 
l' 1Jrchasing the Hansen's two-thirds interest in the property under 
an oral contract. She may even have believed that she was under 
1 le: ;,::11 obligation to repay the Hansens and that until she did so 
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she could not sever the joint tenancy. Thus, Mrs. Neil's state 
ments could not be said to comprise the type of clear and con~ 
evidence which this court has required for setting aside an ~i 
deed. 
Finally, plaintiff places great reliance upon a serie: 
of 4 3 receipts executed by Mrs. Hansen purporting to acknowledg: 
receipt of various sums of money from Mrs. Neil (Exhibit 6P.) 
Upon examination, however, these receipt prove to be as incooct 
sive as Mrs. Rogers' testimony. 
With some exceptions, the receipts in question contair, 
the following information: Date (from October 20, 1944 to Augu: 
5, 1949), person paying the money (Mrs. Neil), person receiving 
the money (Mrs. Hansen), amount of payment (usually $25.00), 
previous balance ($2,389.00 on receipt #1), the balance due 
($1,055.00 as of the date of the last receipt) and the purposec 
the payment (usually "payment on house" or "payment on home"). 
These receipts suffer from the same paucity of detail 
as the remarks attributed to Mrs. Neil in .Mrs. Rogers' testirnon' 
If, for example, Mrs. Neil had been buying the property from thi 
Hansens under an installment contract for sale, the receipts ~ 
be exactly the same as those found in Exhibit 6P. Similarly, 
receipts in question could demonstrate that Mrs. Neil repaid 
the Hansens because they purchased the home for her and allowe: 
her to live in it during her life. Thus, the receipts lack t~ 
clarity and conclusivness necessary to overcome the absolute ~ 
In light of the above analysis, the trial court was 
clearly correct in ruling as one of its conclusions of Law: 
-16-
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There is no clear and convincing evidence of the 
intent of the parties to the 1944 Deed to have 
created a relationship other than a joint tenancy 
as between the grantees. 
since there is sufficient evidence to support the court's Findings 
and Conclusions, the judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Because of ambiguities in plaintiff's Complaint and in 
plaintiff's response to subsequent attempts by defendants; counsel 
to clarify plaintiff's theory for quieting title, the trial court 
and defendants' counsel assumed that one of plaintiff's theories 
was that Mrs. Neil had entered into a contract with defendants for 
purchase of their two-thirds interest in the property. Since there 
was no evidence that such an agreement existed in written form, the 
court correctly ruled that such an agreement would have been barred 
by the statute of frauds. (See the trial court's Conclusion No. 7 
(Tr. 113) .) As plaintiff has now unequivocally stated that hers is 
an action to quiet title based upon the doctrine of equitable 
mortgage, (see plaintiff's Statement of the Kind of Case) plaintiff 
argues that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to this action. 
In this regard, defendants respectfully submit that under the 
peculiar facts of this case the statute of frauds is applicable 
and does bar plaintiff's action. 
A. THIS ACTION FALLS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Utah's Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Ann. 
11'.!53) provides: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property or 
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
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granted, assigned, surrendered or declared other-
wise by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, ass~gning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent there-
unto authorized by writing. 
An exception to the above rule is found in Section 25-5-2 which 
states: 
The next preceeding section shall not be construed 
. • • to prevent any trust from arising or being 
extinguished by implication or operation of law. 
In general, this latter provision (Section 25-5-2) h~ 
been construed by the courts to take equitable mortgages out of· 
statute of frauds on the theory that the transferee of a deed 
intended as a mortgage holds the deed in constructive trust for 
the transferor. The Restatement describes the above rule as fol 
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transf~s 
it inter vivas to another in trust for the transferor, 
but no memorandum properly evidencing the intention tc 
create a trust is signed, as required by the statute 
of frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the 
trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a con-
structive trust for the transferor, if 
(c) The transfer was made as security for an indeb'. 
ness of the transferor 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §44 (1954). 
The above rule has been adopted by Utah courts in sue' 
cases as Wasatch Mineral Co. v. Jennings, 5 Utah 243, 15 P.65, • 
(1887), and Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343, 13~ 
(1972). It is significant to note, however, that in both of fr 
above cases the mortgagor had executed a deed absolute in favor 
the mortaagee. Indeed, plaintiff freely admits that she has ~ 
unable to find any Utah cases in which an equitable mortgage wi 
created by means of a conveyance fro~ a third-party grantor to 
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grantees who bore the relationship of mortgagor/mortgagee to one 
another. (See Appellant's Brief, P. 9.) 
The above quoted passage from the Restatement clearly 
relates only to situations in which A conveys to B by absolute deed, 
but intends only to create a mortgage interest in B. Under such 
circumstances, the transaction is clearly within the trust excep-
tion to the statute of frauds since the law imposes a constructive 
trust on the property. This is not the case where A conveys to B 
and C, intending to convey the property in fee to B subject to a 
mortgage in favor of C. Under such circumstances, Section 45 of 
the Restatement sets forth a different rule: 
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers 
it inter vivas to another in trust for a third person 
but no memorandum properly evidencing the intention 
to create a trust is signed, as required by the statute 
of frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the 
trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a 
constructive trust for the third person, if, but only 
if, 
(a) The transferee by fraud, duress or undue 
influence prevented the transferor from creating 
an enforceable interest in the third person, or 
(b) The transferee at the time of the transfer 
was in a confidential relation to the transferor, 
or 
(c) The transfer was made by the transferor in 
anticipation of death. 
Restatem~nt (Second) Trusts, §45. 
As adopted in Utah, this doctrine is even broader than 
the rule proposed by the Restatement. Thus, in Chadwick v. Arnold, 
34 Utah 48, 95 P. 527, 530 (1908) the court stated: 
(I]f A, having no interest in the real estate, .ora~ly 
agrees with B that the latte~ sho~ld ~urchase it with 
his own funds and take the title in his own name, and 
that he should thereafter convey it to A upon an agreed 
price, no resulting or construc~iv~ trust arises, and 
. such a contract is also within the statute of 
frauds. 
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Thus, while in general the statute of frauds requires that a 
conveyance of an interest in land be in writing, a \vell-recogni: 
exception to this rule is that the statute is inapplicable to ~ 
creation of a trust. As a consequence, in most equitable mortg' 
cases, the statute is inapplicable because the courts which hav: 
recognized the existence of an equitable mortgage have also recc 
nized the existence of a constructive trust. It follows that h 
cases where no trust is present the enforcement of an equitable 
mortgage may be barred by the statute of frauds. This is the 
significance of Section 45 of the Restatement and the rule set 
forth in Chadwick v. Arnold, supra. 
In the instant action, M.rs. Neil,having only a small 
equitable interest in the property allegedly orally agreed with 
defendants that they should purchase the property with their owr 
funds and take title to a two-thirds interest in their own name, 
and that they should convey it to Mrs. Neil upon an agreed price 
Thus, even if plaintiff's allegations are true, under the rule 
Chadwick v. Arnold, supra, the agreement is unenforceable under 
the statute of frauds. 
But even if the more liberal Restatement rule were 
adopted, the necessary prereguisi tes to the creation of a cons\' 
tive trust are not present. These are: (a) transfer under dur, 
fraud or undue influence, or (b) transfer to one who holds a 
confidential relationship to the transferor, or (c) transfer~ 
anticipation of death. It should be noted that these elements 
are not present here. The court specifically found that the d; 
was not executed under the influence of fraud or duress. 
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(Conclusion of Law No. 4, Tr. 113.) Indeed, plaintiff has not 
alleged the existence of fraud, duress or undue influence. Simi-
larly, it is not contended--and the evidence would not support 
such an allegation--that the tranferees, Mrs. Neil and the Hansens, 
stood in a confidential relationship to the grantor, Mr. Newsome. 
Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that the transfer was 
made in anticipation of the transferor's death, nor does plaintiff 
allege this to be the case. 
Thus, the facts in the instant case do not give rise to 
a finding that a constructive trust was created. Because the 
alleged arrangement between Hrs. Neil and the defendants was not in 
writing, the transaction falls with the statute of frauds. 
B. THE DOCTRINES OF PART PERFORMANCE AND WRITTEN 
MEMORANDUM ARE INAPPLICABLE 
Plaintiff further contends that even if the statute of 
frauds were otherwise applicable, the transaction in question is 
taken out of the statute by reason of the doctrines of part 
performance and written memorandum. These doctrines are set forth 
in the Utah Code as follows: 
Section 25-5-3. Leases and Contracts for Interest in 
Lands - Every contract ... for the sale, of any lands, 
or-aDy interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
v1r i ting subscribed by the party by whom the lease or 
sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 
Section 25-5-8. Right to Specific Performance Not 
Affected - Nothing in this chapter contained shall 
be construed to abridge the power of courts to compel 
the specific performance of agreements in case of part 
performance thereof. 
Conceptually, both the doctrines of part performance and 
·i_fi_c performance are based upon the same basic premise, namely, 
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that an agreement otherwise unenforceable under the statute of 
frauds will be enforced if the actions of the parties have so 
clearly defined the terms of the contract as to permit its en-
forcement. Thus, as to part performance, it has been stated: 
[T]hree general criteria emerge in removing an oral 
contract from the statute of frauds by part perfor-
mance. First, the oral contract and its terms must 
be clear and definite; second, the acts done in 
performance of the contract must be equally clear 
and definite; and third, the acts must be in reliance 
on the contract. Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 
6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480, 484 (1956). See also 
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds, §407. 
Similarly, as to the doctrine of written memorandum, 
it has been stated: 
A memorandum sufficient to satisfy i..J,.::. requirement of 
the statute of frauds must be complete in i~qelf as 
to the parties to, and the essential terms of, ~~~ 
contract. The memorandum cannot rest partly in 
writing and partly in parol; that is to say, a de-
ficiency in the memorandum cannot be supplied by para! 
evidence. 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds, §296. 
This court has also adopted the above rule. In Birdu 
v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578, 580 (1952) 
this court stated: 
It is fundamental that the memorandum which is relied 
upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all 
the essential terms and provisions of the contract. 
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the mere 
existence of a set of receipts purporting to acknowledge recei¢ 
of a certain sum of money from Mrs. Neil by Mrs. Hansen for "pa; 
on house" does not necessarily take this case out of the staW~ 
of frauds. The critical question as raised by the above cited 
authorities is whether the terms of the alleged contract are 
clearly enough shown by part performance and by the receipts U 
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permit enforcement thereof. An examination of the alleged acts of 
pact perfor~ance and of the receipts shows that the provisions 
for which plaintiff seeks specific performance cannot be deduced 
from the acts of Mrs. Neil and the Hansens. 
As described above, the receipts typically show acknow-
ledgment of a sum of money (usually $25.00} from Mrs. Neil by Mrs. 
Hansen. The document shows the date of the receipt, the balance 
due and the fact that the payment was for "payment on home" or 
"payment on house". Even assuming that Mrs. Neil did in fact 
receive the payments receipted--and she denies this fact-- the 
last receipt shows a balance due of $1,055.00 (the first receipt 
shows a beginning balance due of $2,389.00). The key question, 
then, is: Do the above described receipts evidence the intention 
of Mrs. Neil and the defendants to create a mortgage? Defendants 
respectfully submit that this question must be answered in the 
negative. 
It is important to note that the receipts in question 
show any of a number of possible relationships between Mrs. Neil 
and the defendants. The following is a partial list of such possible 
relationships: 
1. Mortgagor-Mortgagee 
Admittedly, receipts like the ones in question could 
show payrnen t by Hrs. Neil as mortgagor to the Hansens as mortgagees. 
However, in view of the fact that the receipts cease in August, 
1919, showing a remaining balance of in excess of 40 percent of the 
starting balance, and in view of the fact that none of the receipts 
1 ~fer to a loan or to a mortgage, this explanation seems unlikely. 
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Furthermore, if the defendants understood that they held a mon 
in the subject property, it is difficult to understand why th~ 
would have not foreclosed on their mortgage or to have exacted 
interest on the underlying obligation. 
2. Contract of Sale 
The receipts might also be interpreted to show that ti 
Hansens were selling their two-thirds interest in the subjectp: 
perty to Mrs. Neil by an oral installment contract. 
3. Repayment of Unsecured Loan 
Since plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence of a 
mortgage, it is also fair to assume that Mrs. Neil considered 
herself to be indebted to the Hansens by virtue of their having 
purchased the property with their own money and having placed Mr 
Neil's name on the deed as a one-third interest holder. The 
receipts could therefore show an attempt by Hrs. Neil to repay 
the Hansens for their having purchased her one-third interest,c 
for their allowing her to remain in possession of the home and'. 
keep the rent money. 
4. Welfare Payments 
One other explanation for the existence of the recipt: 
has been offered. Mrs. Hansen testified that she gave her moth0 
the receipts without actually having received money to allow Hr: 
Neil to qualify for extra welfare benefits. The practice of 
giving receipts was terminated in 1949 when rtrs. Neil remarri~ 
and thus became ineligible for the benefits which had been obta 
by use of the receipts. 
The above discussion is not intended to convince thl' 
court of the correctness of any one of the proposed explanati~ 
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for the existence of the receipts. Rather, it simply illustrates 
the fact that the receipts are ambigious in describing the rela-
tionship between Mrs. neil and the defendants. Thus, if the 
receipts are, indeed, memoranda as the plaintiff suggests, then 
they are memoranda which do not set forth the terms of the alleged 
contract with sufficient clarity to permit specific performance. 
Recognizing this fact, the trial court concluded: 
8. The receipts executed by Mrs. Hansen were in-
sufficient to take the alleged agreement out of 
the statute of frauds under the doctrine of part 
performance or written memorandum. (Tr. 114.) 
Finally, it is clear that the doctrine of part perfor-
mance has no application to this case, because that doctrine is 
applicable only where plaintiff seeks specific performance. See 
Section 25-5-8, supra. In the instant action, plaintiff has 
specifically stated that her action for quiet title is based upon 
the theory of equitable mortgage. (Brief of Appellant, page 1.) 
Furthermore, even if plaintiff changes her theory to specific 
performance, her use of that remedy is barred by the statute of 
limitations and by the fact that Mrs. Neil's performance was in-
complete. Thus, it has been stated: 
And although the promisee under a unilateral contract 
is not entitled to specific performance while the 
contract remains executory on his part, he may be 
awarded specific performance after he has performed 
his part of the contract. 
The practical effect of this distinction is that 
while contracts which lack mutuality may not be 
specifically enforced as long as they are executory 
on both sides, when the plaintiff has fully executed 
his obligations he may be entitled to specific 
performance. 71 Arn. Jur. 2d Specific Performance, 
§26, at 44. 
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ded: 
Consistent with this doctrine, the trial court cone Ju 
9. Even if the alleged agreement existed, plaintiff 
would not be entitled to specific performance, since 
Mrs. Neil did not complete her performance. (Tr. 114. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the court correc 
ruled that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of fraud: 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THAT THE 
DOCTRINE OF LACHES BAR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
Plaintiff alleges that the court below was in error~ 
it ruled that her claim was barred by Utah's statutes of limita-
tions and by the doctrine of laches. However, a review of the 
proceedings below, as well as an examination of the applicable! 
reveals that the court was correct in its ruling. Defendants 1:: 
discuss these doctrines separately in the balance of this Poi~ 
A. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS APPLICABLE TO AN 
EQUITABLE ACTION WHERE, LIKE HERE, THE PLAINTIFF 
SEEKS AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF 
Plaintiff's attack on the court's finding that the~ 
of limitations is applicable to the instant action is based upo 
the premise that "a quiet title action is basically equitablel 
therefore, not barred by any statute of limitations". (Appella 
Brief, p. 16.) Plaintiff cites no authority in support of~~ 
proposition. Indeed, an examination of the law reveals that t' 
authorities do not support the rule proposed by the plaintiff. 
Utah's Statute of Limitations makes no distinction bs 
actions at law and at equity. Section 78-12-1 states, for exY 
-26-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Civil actions can be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action 
shall have accrued, except where in special cases a 
differe~t limitation is prescribed by statute. 
(Emphasis added) 
Most jurisdictions have taken the position that an equita-
ble action comes within the purview of "dragnet" or "catchall" 
provisions such as Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Ann. (1953). Thus, 
it has been stated: 
A provision that an action for relief not therein-
before provided for must be commenced within a pre-
scribed period after the cause of action shall have 
accrued has been held to apply to all suits in equity 
not strictly of concurrent cognisance in law and 
equity. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, 
§83. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted a similar position in the 
case of Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995 (1915). 
There the plaintiff brought a quiet title action against a municipal 
corporation in an attempt to remove a tax lien which had been im-
posed as the result of a special sewer tax. Among other defenses 
the defendant stated that the action was barred by Section 2883, 
Comp. Laws of 1907 which provided: 
An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for 
must be com.menced within four years after the cause 
of action shall have accrued. 
The trial court concluded that the statute was not applicable, but 
the Supreme court reversed saying: 
We are very clearly of the opinion that, while 
actions by which nothing is sought except to re-
move a cloud from or to quiet the title to real 
property as against apparent or stale claims are 
not barred by the statute of limitations, yet we 
are also clear that all actions in which the 
principle purpose is to obtain some affirmative 
relief, as was the case here, clearly can come 
Hithin the provisions of Section 2883, supra. 
:1d., at 1001. 
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A similar result was reached in Davidsen v. Salt La~ 
city, 95 Utah 347, 81 P. 2d 374 (1938). There plaintiff brovjlit 
suit in equity seeking to have a deed set aside and to have ttti 
to the subject property quieted in himself. Plaintiff's comp4 
asserted that the deed in question was obtained by fraud. The 
defendant raised as one of its defenses the applicable statub 0 
limitations relating to an action for relief on the ground of fr 
or mistake. The trial court agreed with the defendant's content 
and entered judgment for defendant. On appeal, the Supreme Cour 
affirmed. In doing so, the court reiterated the rule of Brantfr 
This court has also held that, although actions by 
which nothing is sought except to remove a cloud 
from or to quiet the title to real property as 
against apparent or stale claims are not barred 
by the statute of limitations, yet the statute does 
apply to actions in which the principle purpose is 
to obtain some affirmative relief. Id., at 376. 
The court then noted that in the case before it the plaintiff~ 
sought affirmative relief in that he had sought cancellation of 
deed. Id. 
Finally~ in McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah JC 
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court findi 
that an action seeking in the alternative reformation of a warr: 
deed, quiet title, and specific performance, was barred by Sect: 
78-12-23, -25, and -26 of Utah's Statute of Limitations. 
Thus, it is clear that plaintiff is mistaken in ass0 
that an action to quiet title does not come within the statute 
limitations. On the contrary, the rule is that if plaintiff a: 
part of her quiet title action seeks affirmative relief, the 
statute of limitations \1ill bar recovery. Branting v. Salt li 
-28-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
<;:i!Yi Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, supra. Therefore, the critical 
question is whether plaintiff has, in fact, sought affirmative 
relief. 
In the instant action, plaintiff has stated that her 
relief is based upon the theory that as between her as successor 
to Mrs. Neil and the defendants there exists the relationship of 
mortgagor/mortgagee. Since title to the property currently reposes 
in plaintiff and defendants as joint tenants by virtue of the deed 
of 1944 and of the conveyance of .Mrs. Neil's subsequent conveyance 
of her interest in the property to the plaintiff, it is clear that 
what plaintiff actually seeks is either (1) reformation of the 
1944 Deed to show Mrs. Neil as the sole owner, or (2) specific 
performance of the alleged agreement between Mrs. Neil and the 
defendants for conveyance of the defendant's two-thirds interest 
in the property to Mrs. Neil upon payment of a certain sum. In 
either case, plaintiff seeks affirmative relief from this court. 
As a result, the transaction in question is subject to the appli-
cable statute of limitations. (As more fully discussed in Point 
II, plaintiff's reliance on the doctrine of part performance 
indicates that specific performance is sought since §25-5-8 
refers only to that remedy). 
Plaintiff argues that Sections 78-12-25 and 78-12-26 
cannot be applicable in the instant action because all actions 
relating to real property are contained within Sections 78-12-2 
to 78-12-21. Because of the very long lapse of time involved in 
this case, defendants hesitate to quibble over whether this court 
0 hn~1a apply the limitations period of seven years adopted in cases 
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relating to real property or to the shorter periods applicableL 
other types of actions. Indeed, even application of the le~gtli 
limitation period (eight years) would still result in a bar to 
plaintiff's action. 
In reality, it appears the trial court was correct~ 
concluding that plaintiff's action is barred by Sections 78-12~ 
(3) and 78-12-25 which contain limitation periods of respective! 
three and four years. While plaintiff's complaint does not spea 
specifically in terms of fraud or mistake, a review of the trial 
transcript and of the documents filed by plaintiff indicates tha· 
plaintiff's prayer for quiet title is based upon the allegati~: 
fraud or mistake was present. Thus, under the holdings in David 
v. Salt Lake City, and McConkie v. Hartman, supra, the three-yea: 
limitations period of Section 78-12-26 appears applicable. Othe: 
wise, the trial court would have been justified in applying the 
"catchall" provision of Section 78-12-25(2). See Branting v. ~ 
Lake City, supra. 
Assuming one or the other of the above provision to be 
applicable, it remains only to determine at what point the statu: 
beg~n to run. Plaintiff appears to contend that the statutory 
period would begin to run only upon the death of Mrs. Neil, les: 
than a year prior to the commencement of this action. The obvil 
answer to such an argument is, of course, that the statutes of 
limitation are designed to bar recovery on a particular causeo: 
action, not the bringing of suit by a particular individual. Tr 
the statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon the 
accrual of the cause of action. 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of i! 
§107. The time for bringing of an action is not renewed by the 
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death of the aggrieved party or by the conveyance of the property. 
Id., §408. 
Section 78-12-26(3) states that a cause of action based 
on the allegation of fraud or mistake accrues upon "the discovery 
by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake". Similarly, in Branting v. Salt Lake City, supra, the 
court held that the four-year statute of limitations began to run 
when the tax which resulted in the lien was levied, and therefore 
became a matter of public record. Thus, in the instant case the 
limitations period would run from the date when Mrs. Neil became 
aware that the Hansens asserted ownership of a fee, rather than a 
mortgage, interest in the subject property. The evidence suggests 
several possible dates at the time of which Mrs. Neil had such 
knowledge. For example, by a letter dated September 30, 1958, 
(Exhibit 14-P.) Mrs. Hansen in response to a letter written to 
her and her husband by Mrs. Neil's attorney stated that in the event 
of a sale of the house, Mrs. Neil would receive one-third of the 
proceeds and they, the Hansens, would receive two-thirds. She 
wrote: 
So we offered her our little, new rambler to live 
in and sell her house and finish the one we have 
started for ourselves and give her 1/3 of the 
money we got from the house to live on or what-
ever she wanted to do. Ive asked nothing except 
2/3rds. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Since it is plaintiff's contention that Mrs. Neil and 
the defendants bore the relationship of mortgagor-mortgagee, it is 
clear that the above quotation would put a reasonable person on 
n0tice that the alleged ''mortgagees" claimed a two-thirds interest 
th0 ~ubject property, and that their claim was one of fee 
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ownership. 
Plaintiff herself admits that ~1rs. Neil knew as earl~· 
as 1964 that defendants claimed a two-thirds interest in the pro 
perty as joint tenants with Mrs. Neil. In that year, Mrs. neil 
approached a second attorney with the request that he draft two 
quit claim deeds relating to the subject property. The first of 
these deeds showed Hrs. Neil as grantor and plaintiff as grantee 
The second reversed their positions by showing plaintiff as 
granter and Mrs. Neil as grantee. According to plaintiff, the 
express purpose of these deeds was to sever the joint tenancy 
between Mrs. Neil and the defendants. As to the circumstances 
leading up to the execution of these deeds, the plaintiff offen 
the following testimony at trial: 
Q. Now, Mrs. Rogers, I'd like to refer to the 
conversation which took place in the office of Mr. 
Dwight King, and I refer to plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 
3-P and 4-P. Are these deeds deeds which were exe-
cuted in Mr. King's office? 
A. Yes they were. 
Q. And were you present when they were executed1 
A. Yes. 
Q. I don't understand why these deeds were giver 
A. To break the joint tenancy with Hansens and 
mother. 
Q. Then I gather your mother knew [at] the time 
of the making of these deeds the Hansens claimed a 
joint tenancy interest in the property; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. 38-39.) 
Finally, several of the witnesses at trial testifi~i 
to a meeting which took place in 1968 between I!rs. Neil, the 
plaintiff, the defendants and other members of the family. m~ 
there is some disagreement as to the details of that meeting, t· 
witnesses were all in agreement that the discussion related to 
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interest which the Hansens claimed in the subject property. Thus, 
plaintiff testified that in the meeting the defendants openly 
laid claim to a fee interest in the property: 
Q. Isn't it true that they [the Hansens] denied 
that--or, isn't it true that they stated that the house 
was theirs? 
A. Yes, they claimed that it was theirs; that it 
was their "retirement fund," they said. 
(Tr. 30.) 
Similarly, Mrs. Neil's daughter, Gladys Tidwell, testi-
fied that in the course of the conversation, Mrs. Hansen stated that 
if the house were sold she would take "her share". (Tr. 51.) 
Hrs. Hansen testified that at the meeting she stated in 
her mother's presence that there was no mortgage. (Tr. 90.) 
The above described testimony, as well as other testi-
many relating to the 1968 meeting demonstrate that as a result of 
that meeting Mrs. Neil and the plaintiff were aware that the 
Hansens claimed a fee rather than a mortgage interest in the 
property. Since the present action was filed in September, 1975, 
and since the meeting took place in the summer of 1968, it is 
clear that even application of the seven-year ~tatute of limi-
tations will not save plaintiff's action from the bar of the 
statute of limitations. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE 
OF LACHES 
But even if it is concluded that the relief prayed for 
by plaintiff requires no affirmative action by the court and that 
the statutes of limitations are therefore not applicable, it is 
clear that laches bars this action. This court has stated: 
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A court of equity has always refused to aid stale 
demands, where the party has slept upon his rights 
and acquiesced for a great length of time . 
latches and neglect are always discontenanced. 
Ruthrauf f v. Silver King \·iestern Mininq & Mill Co., 
95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 338, 347 (1938). 
While the doctrine of lac hes·· does not require any 
particular length of delay, it has been generally acknowledged 
that a court of equity should look to the analogous statute of 
limitations in determining whether a delay will be deemed unr~~ 
ble: 
[U]nder ordinary circumstances, a suit in equity will 
not be stayed for laches ~efore and will be stayed 
after the time fixed by the analogous statute of 
limitations of law ... 1 Pomeroy's Equitable Reme-
dies, §20 (3rd Edition, 1905). 
In the instant case, it should be noted that plaintiff' 
theory of equitable mortgage is closely analogous to an actiont 
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, or an action upon a~ 
tract obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing. The statutes of limitations for such actions are, 
respectively, three and four years. Section 78-12-26(3) and 
78-12-25, Utah Code Ann. (1953). As noted in the above discussir 
relating to the running of the statute of limitations, the evide· 
indicates that Mrs. Neil knew as early as 1958, and in no case 
later than 1968, that the Hansens claimed a fee interest in the 
property. Thus, using the applicable statute of limitations M 
an equitable "rule of thumb" it is apparent that a sufficient 
length of time has elaps9d to invoke the defense of lach~s. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the bar oi 
laches requires not only the lapse of time, but the prejudicii 
of the other party because of an unexcused delay. Jacobson v. 
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Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); see also Am. Jur. 2d Equity, 
§169. In Jacobson v. Jacobson, supra, the court pointed to two 
sets of facts showing the type of prejudice through delay which 
1.,·ould permit invocation of la Ches.. Those factors were: (1) 
death of one of the parties and, (2) increase in value of the 
property. Id., at 159. 
The instant action offers strikingly similar facts. 
At least two material witnesses have died since Mrs. Neil became 
aware of the defendant's claim to the property. The first and 
most important of these witnesses is Mrs. Neil herself who died 
on August 24, 1975. The other potential witness was Mrs. Neil's 
attorney, Emmett L. Brown, who died on October 17, 1972. (Tr. 
96.) Similarly, defendants request that this court take notice 
of the fact that since the time of the execution of the 1944 
Deed, real property, including the subject property, has increased 
greatly in value. 
Defendants were further prejudiced by the fact that 
many of the witnesses were unable to recall details of events 
which had transpired many years before. William A. Newsome, the 
grantor under the 1944 Deed, could not even recall having entered 
into the real estate contract with Hrs. Neil and her husband 
1~ich had resulted in the execution of the deed. Neither could 
he remember receiving a downpayment of installments under the 
contract, execution of the deed, or the reason why the buyers 
under the contract were different from the grantees under the deed. 
I Tr. 13-18.) Similarly, at the time of her deposition, Mrs. 
11
: 1 • ·,211 could neither recall the execution of the receipts, nor the 
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purpose for which they were executed. (Deposition of Annie N. 
Hansen, page 12.) Under such circumstances, defendants have 
suffered obvious prejudice to the preparation of their defense. 
This prejudice should raise the defense of laches to bar plain-
tiff's recovery, for, as the U.S. Supreme Court has stated: 
[W]here the seal of death has closed the lips of 
those whose character is involved, and lapse of time 
has impaired the recollection of transactions and 
obscured their details, the welfare of society 
demands the rigid enforcement of the rule of 
diligence. Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224, 274, 
3 6 L. Ed. 13 4 , 15 3 ( 18 9 2) • 
A final example of the prejudice which defendants have 
suffered by virtue of the delay of plaintiff's predecessor in 
interest in bringing this action can be found in the fact that 
the defendants made expenditures for the improvement of the pro-
perty in reliance upon the fact that they were fee title owners. 
These expenditures included financial participation in the rernod 0 
ing of the house, performance of plumbing and electrical work, 
and occasional payment of property taxes. (Tr. 74-75.) 
Thus, defendants have met the burden of showing that 
the delay in bringing this action has caused them prejudice. ~ 
such facts, the court below concluded: 
12. Because of plaintiff's and plaintiff's predeces~ 
delay in bringing an action to quiet title to this 
property, defendants suffered prejudice to the prepa~ 
tion of their defense because of the deaths of severa. 
potentially key witnesses and the loss of memory of 
pertinent events on the part of other witnesses. In 
addition, defendants have suffered financial injury t. 
virtue of their expenditure of money for the proper0 
in the belief that they had a clear unencunbered rigr. 
thereto. Plaintiff's claim is therefore barred by tr 
doctrine of laches. (Tr. 114.) 
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Plaintiff attempts to avoid this conclusion by directing 
this court's attention to a number of exceptions to the doctrine 
of laches. Defendants will attempt to deal briefly with these 
exceptions as they relate to this case. 
1. Intimate Personal Relationship 
Plaintiff argues that because of the intimate personal 
relationship between Mrs. Neil and the defendants, Mrs. Neil 
was excused from bringing an action for quiet title. A reading of 
the authorities cited by plaintiff for this proposition shows that 
the rationale adopted by those authorities is that the accrual of 
a cause of action may be delayed where, because of the close 
personal relationship of the potential litigants, the party who 
may seek enforcement of his rights is not given sufficient notice 
of the adverse claim of the other. That the existence of an 
intimate personal relationship does not prevent the raising of 
lathes as a defense is clearly shown by Jacobson v. Jacobson, supra. 
There the plaintiff and his wife sought to quiet title in them-
selves as against the plaintiff's father and mother. The court 
nonetheless granted judgment in favor of the defendants based upon 
the laches. _ 
In the instant action, there can be no doubt that not-
withstanding the close relationship between defendants and Mrs. 
Neil she nonetheless had notice on several occasions of their 
adverse interest in the subject property. Her delay in bringing 
this action is therefore inexcusable for the purpose of holding 
laches in abeyance. 
2. Possession of the Property 
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Plaintiff next asserts that because her predecessor, 
H.-cs. Neil, was in continual possession of the property from 194c 
until her death, the doctrine of laches has no application. 
While it cannot be doubted that possession of the property is a 
factor to which the courts will look in deciding \1hether delay i 
bringing an action is excusable, it does not follow that this 
factor alone prevents application of the doctrine of laches .. 
Indeed, the significance of the plaintiff's possession in a suU 
in which laChes. is raised as a defense lies in the fact that su: 
possession may give rise to the valid belief in the plaintiff thi 
his right to the property is undisputed. Thus, it has been helci 
that where one of several joint tenants or tenants in common is 
in exclusive possession of land, the other tenants are not charge 
ble with laChes. ;.mless they actually know he is holding adverse. 
to them. Reed v. Bachman, 61 W.Va. 452, 57 S.E. 769, 772 (1901) 
As with such factors as the relationship of the parties, the tr' 
issue is whether the party against whom laches is asserted had 
notice of the adverse claim and of the claimant's intention to 
assert it. 
This conclusion is consistent with Viersen v. Boettch 
387 P.2d 133 (Okla. 1963), which is cited in plaintiff's Brief. 
Although that case related to the applicability of a statute of 
limitations rather than the doctrine of laches, it is nonetheli 
useful in reaching an understanding of the importance, or lack 
thereof, of possession by a party against whom laches is asset 
There plaintiffs claiming fee title ownership in the subject 
property based upon a sheriff's deed sought to quiet title as 
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ayainst the defendants. Defendan~~ ~ounterclaimed to quiet title 
Lo a one-half mineral interest in themselves. Plaintiffs, as 
d2fense to defendants counterclaim, claimed that the counterclaim 
was barred by the 15-year limitations period applicable to such 
actions. (Defendants' claim to the property was based upon a 
deed executed more than 15 years prior to the commencement of the 
law suit). The trial court agreed with plaintiff's assertion and 
hPld that the counterclaim was barred by the statute. On appeal, 
however, the Supreme Court reversed, saying that defendants had 
inadequate notice of plaintiff's claim to the property. The court 
stated: 
The execution and recording of oil and gas leases 
by a mineral co-tenant, standing alone, will not 
support a claim of adverse possession to severed 
mineral [sic] which are owned by and in the con-
structive possession of another. [citations ommitted] 
Possession of the surfarA hy the surface owner con-
stitutes no noticeable claim of adverse possession 
to the owner of the mineral estate. Id., at 138. 
Thus, the critical question in a case where the party 
against whom laches is asserted has been in possession is whether 
delay in bringing a quiet title action is "excusable", i.e., 
whether the party in possession had notice of the adverse claim 
of the party raising the defense of laches. 
In this context, it is important to note that the court 
below found that Mrs. Neil had the requisite notice to raise the 
defense of laches. It stated: 
10. Plaintiff's predecessor, Mrs. Neil, had notice 
of defendants' claim of a two-thirds interest in the 
subject property as early as 1958. Notice of.de~en­
dant' s claim was also communicated to Mrs. Neil in 
1968. (R. 114.) 
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3. Mrs. Neil's Illness 
In a further attempt to avoid application of laches, 
plaintiff asserts that l~s. Neil's delay in bringing a quiet 
title action was excusable because she "was quite ill and did nc 
wish to sue her own daughter." (Appellant's Brief 19.) 
Whether Mrs. Neil's illness provides a sufficient basL 
for a finding of excusable neglect depends, of course, on the 
nature and length of that illness. If, for example, Mrs. Neil 
had been insane from the time she discovered defendants' adverse 
claim until the time of her death, defendants would readily concc 
that her neglect in bringing a quiet title action would be "e~~ 
sable". Here, however, plaintiff's OV'n testimony makes it 
abundantly clear that Mrs. Neil's illness was not of a type whk 
would have prevented her from seeking to quiet title. At trial 
the following colloquy took place between defendants' counsel an: 
plaintiff: 
Q. You testified that your mother was sick 
during the last few years of her life. When did 
her serious illnesses begin? You said she had 
heart trouble, for example. Do you know when her 
heart trouble started up? 
A. I don't know when it started, no. But 
she started to become ill about, oh, maybe nine, 
ten years before she died. 
Q. Was she able to get around at all? 
A. Yes, she would. She would get around; 
very determined lady. 
Q. For example, you said back in 1964 you 
had to go to Mr. King's office back then. Nould 
you say that she \vas --. 
A. She could get around on the bus; yes. 
Q. Was her mind clear during her later 
years? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was she able to behave rationally? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she require someone in attendance 
with her at all times? 
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A. Not until the last month, month and a 
half. 
Q. And up until that time she was able to 
take care of herself? 
A. Pretty much; yes. 
(Tr. 46-47.) 
The above testimony shows that Mrs. Neil suffered a 
lingering illness which lasted nine or ten years. During that 
time her mind was clear, she was active, and she was able to "get 
around" without help from others. Indeed, other evidence referred 
to above indicates that in 1958 and in 1964 she went to the 
offices of two different attorneys for advice as to the ownership 
of the property. 
Under the circumstances, it cannot be doubted that had 
~s. Neil so desired, she would have been perfectly capable of 
obtaining the help of family members and of her attorneys for 
the purpose of bringing a quiet title action. Thus, there is no 
substance to the allegation that her illness provided an excuse 
for delaying the institution of this action. 
In conclusion, plaintiff's contention that the statutes 
of limitations and the doctrine of lathes are inapplicable in 
this action is clearly incorrect. The statute of limitations is 
applied in equitable actions where, as here, plaintiff has sought 
affirmative relief from the courts. But even if the statute were 
inapplicable, the equitable doctrine of laches .. would bar plain-
tiff's action because plaintiff's predecessor in interest delayed 
in excess of eight years in seeking to quiet title and because 
such delay prejudiced defendants. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT CORRCCTLY RULED THAT THE 1944 DEED C?,I:ATI:D 
A ONE-THIRD INTEREST IN EACH OF THE THREE GR.11.~~TEI::S 
In Point IV of her brief, plaintiff advances that nove 
theory tr.at the 1944 Deed by >vhich the Newsomes conveyed their 
interest in the subject property to Mrs. Neil and to defendants 
created a one-half interest in defendants and a one-half inter~ 
in Mrs. Neil. According to plaintiff, this theory "is based fir 
upon the general rule that a conveyance to three people, two of 
whom are husband and wife, results in the husband and wife takin 
one-half of the estate and the third party taking the other half 
of the estate." (Appellant's Brief 22.) 
While plaintiff is certainly to be commended for the 
originality of her theory, an examination of the authorities 
proves her contention to be without merit. 
As a starting point in examining plaintiff's contentio 
two principals must be kept in mind. First, the doctrine propos 
by plaintiff has only been recognized in states which have adopt 
the concept of tenancy by the entireties. All of the cases cite 
by plaintiff in her brief in support of the above doctrine conta 
adknowledgment by the courts that the decisions are based upon 
existence of such a tenancy. Indeed, plaintiff acknowledges thi 
fact when she states: 
The essence of this first basis for conr.ending 
appellant is entitled to one-half rather than 
one-third of the subject property is the common 
law concept of tenancy by the entirety and 
tenancy by the entirety exists in Utah. 
(Appellant's Brief 23.) 
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Second, the proposed rule is at best a rule of construe-
tion relating to the intention of the parties. 
In the remainder of this Point, defendants will consider 
the affect of these principals in relation to the theory proposed 
by plaintiff. 
A. THE RULE OF CONSTRUCTION PROPOSED BY PLAINTIFF 
HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE 
UTAH HAS NOT ADOPTED THE DOCTRINE OF TENANCY 
BY THE ENTIRETIES 
The doctrine of tenancy by the entireties is based upon 
the legal fiction that a husband and wife are a single legal entity. 
Thus, a conveyance to a husband and wife and to a third party is 
said to be a conveyance to two, rather than three, entities. Mosser 
'!. Dolsay, 132 N.J. Eq. 121, 27 A.2d 155, 157 (1942); 4 A. R. 
Powell, The Law of Real Property, 686 (1977). This doctrine was 
purely a creation of the cornrnon law. Id. at 685. 
Plaintiff fails to direct the court's attention to a 
single Utah case or statute adopting the doctrine of tenancy by 
the entireties. Defendants have been similarly unsuccessful in 
finding such authority. Undaunted by this fact, however, plaintiff 
points out that the doctrine is one of common law and that unless 
expressly abrogated by statute, the common law, including tenancy 
by the entireties, is adopted in Utah. As support for this pro-
position, plaintiff points to Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Ann. 
11953), which states: 
The common law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with ... the 
constitution or laws of this state, and so far 
only as it is consistent with and adopted to 
the natural and physical conditions of this 
state and the necessities of the people hereof, 
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. 
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The language of the above statute makes it clear th3 t 
plaintiff is not correct in alleging that "the common law is 
specifically adopted in Utah unless abrogated by statute .. 
(Appellant's Brief 23.) Rather, the correct rule is that the 
corrunon law is abrogated to the extent it is inconsistent with the 
laws of the State. It therefore remains to be determined 
whether any Utah statute is inconsistent with the common law 
doctrine that a conveyance to a husband and wife creates a tenanc 
by the entireties or that a husband and wife are treated as a 
single legal entity. 
Section 57-1-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) states: 
Every interest in real estate granted to two or 
more persons in their ovm rights shall be a 
tenancy in common, unless expressly declared in 
the grant to be otherwise. Use of the words 
"joint tenancy" or "with rights of survivorship" 
or "and to the survivor of them" or words of 
similar import shall declare a joint tenancy. 
A sole owner of real property shall create a 
joint tenancy in himself and another or others 
by making a transfer to himself and such other 
or others as joint tenants by use of such 
words as herein provided or by conveying to 
another person or persons an interest in land 
in which an interest is retained by the granter 
and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy 
by use of such words as herein provided. In all 
cases the interest of joint tenants must be equal 
and undivided. 
The above section is clearly inconsistent with the 
concept of tenancy by the entireties. The statute does not 
differentiate between grantees who are married to one another 
and other types of grantees. Thus, under the statute, a conveya 
to a married couple creates either a tenancy in common or a joi:: 
tenancy. By contrast, if tenancy by the entireties were recog-
nized in this state, a conveyance to two grantees who are husb 1 
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and wife would create a tenancy by the entireties. 
Furthermore, under the above statute a conveyance to 
several grantees in joint tenancy creates an interest in each of 
the joint tenants which "must be equal and undivided." Id., 
(Emphasis added.) But in states which have adopted the doctrine 
of tenancy of the entireties, a grant to three grantees in joint 
tenancy, two of whom are husband and wife, results in the spouses 
each receiving a one-quarter, and the third grantee a one-half, 
interest. In short, the interests of the joint tenants are not 
"equal". 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the concept of 
tenancy by the entireties is "inconsistent" with Section 57-1-5, 
supra. This common law doctrine is therefore not within the body 
of common law grafted into Utah law under Section 68-3-1, supra. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has not expressly denied 
the existence of tenancies by the entireties in this state, the 
court has written decisions whose results are inconsistent with 
the existence of such a tenancy. Thus, in Clearfield State Bank v. 
Contos, 562 P.2d 622 (Utah 1977), the court held that a creditor 
foreclosing upon the interest of one of two joint tenants becomes 
a tenant in common with the remaining spouse. Id., at 624-625. 
It is well-settled that there is no right of survivorship as 
between tenants in common; i.e., the heirs of the deceased tenant 
in common, rather than other co-tenants, inherit the interest of 
the decedent. Thus, when the court in Contos, supra, held that 
the right of either spouse was alienable and that the purchaser 
rif one spouse 1 s interest becomes a tenant in common with the 
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other spouse, it was, in effect, saying that no right of survi-
vorship existed between the remaining spouse and the purchaser. 
The rule in Contos is inconsistent with the theory that 
a conveyance to a married couple creates a tenancy by the entire-
ties. The reason for this is that such a tenancy creates the 
right of survivorship between the spouses, even if one has 
conveyed his interest to a third party. Powell, supra, at 712. 
Thus, in Sieb's Hatcheries v. Lindley, 111 F. Supp. 705, 716 (W.D. 
Ark. 1953), the court stated: 
But, neither a conveyance by one tenant by the 
entirety, nor an execution against such tenant, 
can in any manner affect the interest of the 
other tenant. [Citations omitted] Thus, a 
purchaser of the interest of one tenant by the 
entirety cannot oust the other tenant from 
possession, and can only claim one-half of 
the rents and profits. [Citations omitted] 
The remaining tenant is not only entitled to 
possession plus one-half of the rents and 
profits, but the right of survivorship is not 
destroyed or in any wise affected. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Similarly, in McLean v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. 
Mich. 1963) the court said: 
One incident of an estate by the entirety is that 
the survivor, whether husband or wife, is entitled 
to the whole, and such right cannot be defeated by 
a conveyance by one spouse to a stranger. 
It follows that in states recognizing tenancies by the 
entireties, the purchaser of the interest of one tenant by the 
entireties may be cut off if the tenant from whom he purchased 
predeceases the other tenant. Such a result is inconsistent wit 
Section 57-1-6, supra, permitting creation of a tenancy in conuno 
between "two or more persons" (including spouses), and the a!Jovr 
quoted language from Clearfield State Bank v. Contos, supra. 
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In an attempt to pursuade the court of the continued 
existence of tenancies by the entireties in Utah, plaintiff cites 
several statutes referring to such tenancies. See §§ 78-41-1, 
75-2-1003 and 48-1-4 (2), Utah Code Ann. (1953). While it is 
true that these statutes do make reference to tenancies by the 
entireties, it does not follow that these references show a desire 
on the part of the Utah legislature to acknowledge the creation of 
such tenancies in this state as the product of Utah law. A more 
logical explanation for such references is that the legislature 
recognized that a tenancy by the entireties could be established 
in personal property located in another state, and that that 
property could be brought into this State. Thus, when §78-41-1 
states that upon the death of one whose death "shall affect any 
other interest in property", any person interested in the property 
may petition the court for a determination of his interest, it is 
unlikely that the statute is intended as recognition of the 
doctrine of community property, even though an interest in community 
property may be "any other interest in property" within the meaning 
of the statute. Similarly, where §48-1-4 states that a tenancy 
by the entireties does not of itself establish a partnership, 
that fact in itself does not show legislative recognition of the 
creation of such tenancies under Utah law any more than reference 
in the statute to community property would show that community 
property interests could be created in Utah. At best, these 
statutes simply show an awareness on the part of the legislature 
uf the existence of tenancies by the entireties and of the fact 
~ h.i' [Jroµerty in which such tenancies are be created in other 
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jurisdictions may be brought into this state. 
B. THE PARTIES TO THE 1944 DEED INTENDED TO CREATE 
A JOINT TENANCY 
Even assuming, arguendo, that a tenancy by the entire-
ties may be created under Utah law, it does not fol low that the 
1944 Deed created such a tenancy. At best, the rule proposed~ 
plaintiff is a rule of construction. Thus, it has been stated: 
At common law a conveyance to husband and wife 
and another party presumptively granted a one-
half interest to the third party and a one-half 
interest to the husband and wife as an entirety. 
2 H. Tiffany, Real Property, Section 431 at 222-23 
(1939). But this axiom is only a rule of construc-
tion and the intent of the parties must be 
effected if it can be ascertained. Daniel v. 
Wright, 352 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.C.D.C. 1972) 
(emphasis added). 
From the foregoing it can be seen that the rule pro-
posed by plaintiff is a rule of construction which creates a 
presumption in favor of the creation of a tenancy by the entire-
ties. In cases involving a conveyance to multiple parties, Utah 
has adopted a contrary presumption: 
Where a conveyance is made in the names of a 
number of parties to an instrument, and the 
conveyance does not show respective interests, 
the presumption is that they own in equal 
shares, but such presumption is rebuttable by 
parol evidence. Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184 
72 p. 2d 4 4 9, 4 5 2 ( 19 3 7) . 
Similarly, Section 57-1-5, _supra, states, "in all cases the inte: 
of joint tenants must be equal and undivided." Thus, the ruleo 
construction adopted in Utah appears to be ~he following: (a) 
a conveyance to two or more individuals is conclusively presume: 
to create a tenancy in common in the absence of the use of the 
words "joint tenancy" or words of like import. Section 57-1-S, 
supra. (b) In the event of the creil tion of i1 tenancy in conuno." 
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and absent language in the granting clause to the contrary, a 
rebuttable presumption arises that the parties intended that each 
of the co-tenants will take his interest in equal shares. Garrett 
v. Ellison, supra. (c) Where a conveyance is made to two or more 
individuals who are designated as "joint tenants" such tenants 
are conclusively presumed to have taken their interest in equal 
shares. Section 57-1-5, supra. If, as plaintiff insists, a tenancy 
by the entireties may be created in this state, the only manner in 
which that could occur consistent with Section 57-1-5 and with 
the decision in Garrett v. Ellison, is if the document of conveyance 
specifically recites the fact that the grantees take as tenants 
by the entireties. 
The 1944 Deed at issue in this case does not conform to 
the above requirements, if a tenancy by the entireties between 
defendants had been intended. The Deed states: 
To Myrtle c. Neil and Annie N. Hansen and Albert J. 
Hansen, her husband as joint tenants and not as 
tenants in common and to the survivors or survivor of 
them. 
Clearly under Section 57-1-5 the above formulation 
creates the relationship of joint tenancy between the three grantees 
with each taking a one-third interest in the subject property. 
While the deed is clear enough on its face as to not require parol 
evidence in determining the intent of the parties thereto, it is 
relevant to note that the trial court found that the granters under 
the deed intended to convey the property in joint tenancy to 
defendants and Hrs. Neil. (R. 111, Finding No. 7.) 
Thus, even if this court holds that a tenancy by the 
irctios may be created under Utah law, the findings of the 
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trial court, as well as Section 57-1-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
support the court's conclusion of law and its judgment thut de[, 
dants each took a one-third interest as joint tenants under the 
1944 Deed. 
CONCLUSION 
The linchpin of plaintiff's attack on the decision of 
the trial court is the proposition that the evidence did not sup; 
the court's finding that the 1944 Deed was intended to convey fee 
title in the subject property to Mrs. Neil and defendants as joi 
tenants. Unless this court finds that there was insufficient ev: 
dence to support the trial court's findings, plaintiff's argumen' 
as to the inapplicability of the statute of frauds, the statutec 
limitations, and the doctrine of laches is irrelevant. 
Defendants have demonstrated by reference to the trial 
transcript that there was ample evidence to support the trial co': 
judgment. While defendants are of the opinion that plaintiff's 
evidence was woefully inadequate for the purpose of overturning 
a ~eed absolute, that fact, too, is irrelevant in light of the 
finding of the tryer of fact that the parties to the 1944 Deed 
intended to create precisely those interests which are described 
the granting clause; namely, a joint tenancy between Mrs. Neila· 
the defendants. 
Similarly, plaintiff's theory that the conveyance to Mr 
Neil and defendants as joint tenants created a one-half interest 
Mrs. Neil and a one-half interest in the defendants is basical~ 
a question of intent. In reviewing the evidence the trial coL1C 
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concluded that the intent of the parties was to create a one-
third i~terest in each of the grantees. 
This court has always recognized the principal that the 
tryer of fact is better able to analyze and weigh the evidence 
than is an appellate court. This court has therefore adopted the 
view that it should survey the record in light favorable to the 
findings of the tryer of fact. Kesler v. Rogers, supra. Since 
the record of the proceedings below shows that there was ample 
evidence to support the court's findings, plaintiff's appeal must 
be denied. 
Furthermore, the failure of the alleged parol agreement 
between Mrs. Neil and defendants to qualify as a constructive 
trust means that the mortgage would be unenforceable under the 
statute of frauds. Similarly, because of the lapse of time in 
enforcing the agreement, plaintiff's claim is barred by latches and 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of December, 1977. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Respondents 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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